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Abstract 
The article discusses the question whether Swiss law offers an equal level of protection for animals being 
used in research projects and those being genetically modified and bred for these projects. To answer this 
question the article argues, first, that animal dignity has a sacrosanct core content which prohibits highly 
cruel treatments or killing methods, denial of an animal’s essential natural needs as well as exclusive 
instrumentalization. However, a use that does not infringe the sacrosanct core can be justified by prevailing 
interests, as is the case within authorisation procedures of animal experimentation. During the approval 
procedure, the competent authority conducts a harm–benefit assessment to define, rate and evaluate the 
conflicting interests. Next, the article examines the issue of the breeding of genetically modified laboratory 
animals being subject to laxer requirements than other animal experiments. The projects are subject to a 
simplified procedure that does not include a “traditional” harm–benefit assessment. The article argues that 
the harm–benefit assessment is the key to a sufficient protection of laboratory animals and their dignity. 
Due to the purely “trailed” assessment as well as potential negligence in regard to reporting obligations 
regarding strains suffered by the animal, the application of the simplified procedure raises certain doubts 
as to whether it provides a sufficient protection of animal dignity. Moreover, it is argued that the breeding 
of genetically modified animals exclusively for test purposes constitutes an excessive instrumentalization 
of these animals. The article, therefore, weighs the instrumentalization against (human) interests, but holds 
that even if some prevailing interests are conceivable, the severe infringement of animal dignity cannot be 
justified.  
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Switzerland is the only country worldwide laying down the concept of the dignity of living beings, which 
includes animal dignity, in its national constitution and statutory law. Although Swiss law accords dignity 
to all animals, the protection differs in regard to species or purpose. When it comes to animal 
experimentation, Swiss legislation subjects all experiments to the condition of obtaining approval. 
Therefore, the Animal Protection Act (AniPA)1, in conjunction with the Animal Protection Ordinance 
(AniPO)2, introduces two different authorisation procedures: first, as a rule, a “regular” authorisation 
procedure is applied when applying for a permission to perform animal experimentation. The heart of 
the “regular” procedure is a so-called harm–benefit analysis that serves to weigh the strain suffered by 
the animal in the course of an experiment against the possible benefit for human and animal health, 
society or the environment. Animal dignity is to be taken into account within the harm–benefit 
assessment as an independent criterion. Second, the simplified procedure, that only applies to the 
breeding of genetically modified animals using established methods3, takes animal dignity into account 
insofar as a (ex ante) harm–benefit assessment is conducted if there is reason to believe that the dignity 
of the transgenic animal is disregarded. Thus, the simplified procedure encompasses a so-called “trailed 
assessment” that prescribes a harm–benefit evaluation of the genetic modification only under certain 
circumstances. The question arises whether both procedures provide a sufficient level of protection of 
(transgenic) animals being used for scientific purposes. 
To answer this question, the article first provides a brief overview of the concept of animal dignity in the 
Swiss legal system. In order to do so, it takes a glance at the constitutionally enshrined dignity of living 
beings (dignity of the creature) and the statutory animal dignity. In this context, the article examines 
whether animal dignity has a sacrosanct core. Based on this analysis, the article takes a look at the 
different authorisation processes of animal experimentation. The following section assesses the 
protection of animal dignity within the “regular” procedure. In this context, I point out that the harm–
                                                 
1 Tierschutzgesetz [Animal Protection Act; AniPA] (2010) SR 455. 
2 Tierschutzverordnung [Animal Protection Ordinance, AniPO] (2008) SR 455.1. 
3 This article focusses only on animals modified genetically for experimental purposes. Modifications for other purposes, 
such as teaching or diagnostics, will be ignored. A genetically modified organism is every organism that has been altered in 
a way that does not occur under natural conditions by crossing or natural recombination (Art. 5 no. 2 Gentechnikgesetz; 




benefit assessment is the key to a sufficient protection of the dignity of animals that are used for scientific 
purposes or those that are genetically modified for these purposes. Subsequently, the question arises 
whether the simplified procedure fails to guarantee a sufficient protection of animal dignity. Especially 
the fact that the simplified procedure only provides for a “trailed” assessment of dignity violations is 
analysed. Moreover, other risks in this regard, as the issue that the responsible person fails to comply 
with certain reporting obligations, will be addressed. Finally, an in-depth look will be taken at the issue 
whether the instrumentalization of test-tube animals is an unjustified encroachment on animal dignity. 
The article concludes that, in general, both licensing procedures provide sufficient protection of animal 
dignity, as various mechanisms and safety nets are put in place in order to prevent the disregard of animal 
dignity. However, the application of the simplified procedure may result in an unjustified excessive 
instrumentalization of transgenic animals being used for subsequent test purposes. The article, finally, 
presents an approach to a solution. 
2. The concept of animal dignity in Swiss law 
In the course of a constitutional amendment in 1992, the dignity of (non-human) living beings (Würde 
der Kreatur) was introduced into the Swiss Federal Constitution (Cst.).4 Art. 120 para. 1 Cst. (formerly 
Art. 24novies) lays down that human beings and their environment shall be protected against any misuse 
of gene technology. For this purpose, the provision empowers (and obligates) the Swiss Confederation 
to adopt provisions about the use of reproductive and genetic material derived from animals, plants or 
other organisms, taking into consideration the dignity of living beings. Art. 120 para. 2 Cst. complements 
this mandate with an institutional guarantee of the protection of the dignity of (non-human) creatures.5 
In fact, the Confederation shall be guided by this principle at all times within Swiss jurisdiction.6 
However, the dignity of the creature is a relative principle, as the legislator may adopt restrictive 
                                                 
4 Art. 120 para. 2 Cst. [Bundesverfassung; Constitution, Cst.] (2009) SR 101.  
5 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGE) 135 II 384, 403 E. 4.6.1.; 135 II 405, 414 f. E. 4.3.4; BGer 2C_958/2014, E. 
5.1. 
6 Bernhard Waldmann, ‘Art. 120 Cst.’ in Bernhard Waldmann, Eva M Belser and Astrid Epiney (eds), Schweizerische 




measures in order to protect other (preponderant) interests and rights.7 The Confederation enjoys 
considerable leeway with regard to implementation.8 
Considering its fate as a rather vague constitutional concept, the dignity of the creature still needs – 25 
years after its introduction – further clarification.9 Case law and legal scholars agree that the dignity of 
the creature introduces a legally acknowledged inherent value of animals, plants and other (non-human) 
organisms, which is permanent and not transitory.10 The scope of Art. 120 para. 2 Cst. encompasses 
exclusively individual creatures, which possess a value of their own as well as an ability to pursue 
individual objectives. They are to be treated with diligence, care and moderation by the human dealing 
with them.11 However, the degree of protection may differ depending on the creature’s evolutionary 
development.  
With this constitutional amendment, the pathocentrism that had prevailed until then, according to which 
all animals are to be protected for their own sake if they are sentient beings, has been extended to a 
restrictive biocentrism in which animals (and plants as well as other organisms to a certain extent) have 
an inherent dignity and value, which can be benefited and harmed, regardless of their sentience.12 
Animal dignity 
In line with its legislative mandate, the Confederation revised the AniPA and the AniPO in 2008. Art. 1 
AniPA defines as its main purpose the protection of the well-being and the dignity of the animal. Animal 
dignity, which is derived from the concept of the dignity of the creature, has become a guiding principle 
                                                 
7 Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, ‘Dignity of the animal: Explanatory notes on the 'weighing of interest'’ (1 May 
2017), at 2; Waldmann (n 6), at 1929. 
8 Providing detailed information to Art. 120 Cst. ibid; Gieri Bolliger, Animal dignity protection in Swiss law: Status quo and 
future perspectives (Schriften zum Tier im Recht volume 15, Schulthess 2016), at 36. 
9 Federal Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology/Swiss Committee on Animal Experiments, ‘The dignity of 
animals’ (Berne 2008) <http://www.ekah.admin.ch/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/e-Broschure-Wurde-Tiere-
2001.pdf>; Stefanie Schindler, ‘The animal's dignity in Swiss Animal Welfare Legislation – challenges and opportunities’ 
(2013) 84 (2) European journal of pharmaceutics and biopharmaceutics, 251; Christoph Errass, ‘20 Jahre Würde der 
Kreatur’ (2013) 149 ZBJV 187, 202 et seq. 
10 Christoph Errass, Öffentliches Recht der Gentechnologie im Ausserhumanbereich (Stämpfli 2006) at 79; Federal Ethics 
Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology/Swiss Committee on Animal Experiments (n 9).  
11 Margot Michel and Eveline Schneider Kayasseh, ‘The Legal Situation of Animals in Switzerland: Two Steps forward, 
One step back - Many Steps to go’ (2012) VII Journal of Animal Law 1, 4 et seq. 
12 Federal Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology/Swiss Committee on Animal Experiments (n 9), at 10; 
Administrative Court Zurich, decision of 5th April 2017, VB.2016.00048, at 61 E. 9.5.2.; Errass, ‘20 Jahre Würde der 




of Swiss animal welfare legislation.13 The term, as employed in the statute, is defined in its Art. 3 lit. a 
as the inherent value of each animal which is to be respected while dealing with the animal. Its dignity 
is disregarded if pain, suffering, anxiety or harm is inflicted on the animal, if it is made subject to 
humiliation or debasement, if it suffers major interference with its phenotype or abilities, or in the case 
of excessive instrumentalization. Such violations can be justified by prevailing public interests. As a 
result, the animal welfare legislation attributes an intrinsic value to each individual animal regardless of 
its having been born naturally or as the result of a scientific experiment. The animal is to be protected for 
its own sake, not merely for its use by human beings.14  
The sacrosanct core of the dignity of the creature 
As the Swiss Constitution does not specify the normative content of the concept of dignity of the creature, 
human dignity (Art. 7 Cst.) may act as a reference value to determine its meaning, since both the concepts 
are alike in many ways, as well as being dogmatically and terminologically comparable.15 The dignity of 
the creature, including animal dignity, is not an individual right but an obligation for humans to respect 
and protect living beings. Nevertheless, it shall not be interpreted in a way fundamentally different from 
human dignity, but regarded and valued similarly.16 According to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, the 
values as protected in the constitution are comparable, but not identical.17 
It is widely acknowledged that human dignity has a sacrosanct core.18 Yet, the core has not been 
conclusively defined. The idea is to guarantee the treatment of humans as subjects and sentient beings 
with a self-inherent value. Considering the absolute level of protection of the human dignity, a violation 
                                                 
13 Bolliger, Animal dignity protection in Swiss law (n 8), passim. 
14 Margot Michel, ‘Die Würde der Kreatur und die Würde des Tieres im schweizerischen Recht: Eine Standortbestimmung 
anlässlich der bundesgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung’ (2012) NuR 102, 104; decision of the Federal Supreme Court 135 
II 384, 403 E. 4.6.1.; 135 II 405, 414 f. E. 4.3.4. 
15 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court  135 II 384, 403 E. 4.6.1., 135 II 405, 414 f. E. 4.3.4, 2C_958/2014, E. 5.1.; 
Praetorius Ina and Peter Saladin, ‘Die Würde der Kreatur (Art. 25 novies Abs. 3 BV)’ (Berne 1996). For information to 
human dignity see Eva M Belser and Eva Molinari, ‘Art. 7 Cst.’ in Bernhard Waldmann, Eva M Belser and Astrid Epiney 
(eds), Schweizerische Bundesverfassung (Basler Kommentar, 1st ed. Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2015). 
16 Ulrich Häfelin and others, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (9th ed. Schulthess 2016), at 28 et seq.; Gotthard M 
Teutsch, Die "Würde der Kreatur": Erläuterungen zu einem neuen Verfassungsbegriff am Beispiel des Tieres (P. Haupt 
1995). 
17 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGE) 135 II 384, 403 E. 4.6.1.; 135 II 405, 414 f. E. 4.3.4. 
18 See for instance Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, Alexander Misic and Nicole Töpperwien, Swiss constitutional law (Kluwer Law 




of human dignity is simultaneously a violation of its core content.19 As the dignity of the creature 
admittedly does not have the same weight as human dignity within the Swiss society and legal system, it 
is still under debate whether it has a sacrosanct core as well.20 In consideration of the legislative principle 
that requires uniform interpretations of the same terminology, the Federal Supreme Court’s case law as 
well as the alleged intention of the Swiss legislator not to formulate animal dignity as a paper tiger,21 a 
core content of the dignity of the creature can be assumed. This signifies that both dignities share a 
common or at least similar core content, which lies in the specific intrinsic value of all human and non-
human living beings and their integrity.22 In conformity with human dignity, the core content of the 
dignity of the creature comprises, therefore, the prohibition of highly cruel treatments or killing methods, 
the denial of an animal’s essential natural needs as well as exclusive instrumentalization.23 An 
infringement of this core cannot be justified under any circumstances. From my point of view there is no 
human interest conceivable that might justify such a severe violation of the intrinsic value and integrity 
of a creature. An infringement of the dignity of the creature, that does not affect its core, can, however, 
be justified.24 Therefore, the sacrosanct core is to be interpreted rather restrictively and thus only highly 
cruel treatments or killing methods, the denial of an animal’s essential natural needs as well as exclusive 
instrumentalization cannot be justified by predominant interests. 
3. The different authorisation procedures of animal experimentation  
The carrying out of an animal experiment requires, without exception, a permission of the responsible 
cantonal authority (Art. 18 para. 1 AniPA). Therefore, every animal experiment is subject to an 
authorisation procedure. Arts. 17 ss. AniPA in conjunction with Arts. 139–142 AniPO entail the major 
details of animal experimentation law in general, as well as the authorisation procedures that the 
                                                 
19 ibid, at 215; Gieri Bolliger, ‘Legal Protection of Animal Dignity in Switzerland: Status Quo and Future Perspectives’ 
(2016) 22 Animal Law 311, 329 et seq. (providing further references). 
20 ibid, 329.  
21 Peter Kunzmann, ‘Die "Würde des Tieres" - Grund oder Gegenstand einer Güterabwägung’ (2011) TIERethik 56; Federal 
Council, ‘Erläuterung zur Revision der Tierschutzverordnung’ 
<https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/gg/pc/documents/1337/Bericht.pdf> (accessed 15.12.2017). 
22 Nils Stohner, Importrestriktionen aus Gründen des Tier- und Artenschutzes im Recht der WTO: Dargestellt namentlich 
am Beispiel des Pelzhandels unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ausnahmebestimmung von Art. XX lit. a GATT sowie 
des schweizerischen Verfassungsgrundsatzes der Würde der Kreatur (Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht, Stämpfli 
2006), at 121, 129 et seq. (providing further references). 
23 ibid.  




researcher needs to go through prior to the performance of an animal experiment in detail. The detailed 
requirements may vary depending on the purpose and method of the experiment. The AniPO 
distinguishes between a regular procedure which applies to all projects intending to use laboratory 
animals, and the (less restrictive) simplified procedure that applies to the breeding of transgenic animals 
when using established methods.  
The “regular” procedure is outlined in Chapter 6, Section 5 AniPO, which lays down the legal 
requirements according to which the cantonal authority decides on the approval of an animal experiment. 
The applicant must outline especially the anticipated benefits of the test and the severity of the strain the 
used animal is expected to suffer as the result of the experiment.25 Thus, the researcher should explain 
the need for the experiment, the number and kind of laboratory animals required, the expected degree of 
severity and the anticipated outcome. The application should also establish the fulfilment of the 
requirements on the keeping and personal handling of laboratory animals.26 The competent authority 
examines the application on a case-by-case basis and – provided that all the requirements are met – issues 
a license. The authority will, thus, have to conclude that the expected benefit overrides the strain on the 
animal and/or the violation of its dignity. The degree of severity is determined in accordance with the 
categories laid down in Arts. 24, 25 AniEO27. Art. 137 AniPO provides criteria assisting in weighing 
harm and benefit. The provision stipulates that distressful animal experiments must be restricted to what 
is indispensable for the carrying out of the experiment. Criteria for determining the indispensability of a 
test are laid down in the provision. In general, an animal experiment shall not be approved if the harm–
benefit analysis turns out to be to the disproportionate disadvantage of the animal’s well-being or dignity 
(Art. 140 Abs. 1 lit. b AniPO).  
A variety of bodies is involved in the authorisation process. Next to the cantonal veterinary offices, 
cantonal commissions on animal experimentation examine every application of a distressful animal test 
                                                 
25 Cf. information of the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, ‘Application and Authorisation’, 
<https://www.blv.admin.ch/blv/en/home/tiere/tierversuche/antrag-bewilligung-tv.html#-589213524> (accessed 05.03.2018). 
26 FSVO, ibid.  




and provide a recommendation to the cantonal authorities (Art. 18 para. 3 AniPA; Art. 139 para. 4 
AniPO).28  
Art. 11 para. 4 AniPA allows for the Federal Council to adopt exceptions or simplifications to the regular 
authorisation procedure when the breeding of genetically modified animals is concerned and the methods 
being used do not cause the animal any pain, suffering, harm or behavioural disorders (“established 
methods”). Moreover, animal dignity must be sufficiently respected and protected. All other methods of 
breeding transgenic animals qualify as regular animal experiment, subject to the regular procedure. The 
Federal Council made use of Art. 11 para. 4 AniPA by adopting a simplified procedure in Art. 142 
AniPO. The provision introduces a procedure for the breeding of transgenic animals using an established 
method.29 The procedure is governed by the provisions of the authorisation of husbandry of laboratory 
animals, “regular” breeding and trade with animals (Arts. 122, Art. 142 para. 3 AniPO). The provisions 
concerning distressful animal testing (Art. 136 AniPO), the criteria on the evaluation of the extent of 
indispensability (Art. 137 AniPO) and the procedural provisions for animal experiments (Arts. 139, 140 
AniPO) do not apply. To qualify for the simplified procedure, the genetically modified animal must be 
bred using an established method (Art. 142 para. 1 lit. a AniPO). The Federal Food Safety and Veterinary 
Office defines the different methods in Art. 9 para. 1 and Annex 1 AniEO, which provide an exhaustive 
list of methods that are currently acknowledged as being “established”. These methods are frequently 
used within the praxis and are – compared to other methods – “animal friendly”. Furthermore, the method 
must be carried out using a standard protocol (Art. 9 para. 3) and be performed in an “animal friendly” 
way. Art. 142 para. 2 AniPO lays down certain further requirements of which the applicant needs to 
prove compliance with.  
4. Protection of animal dignity within the regular procedure 
The next sections examine if and to what extent the regular procedure provides for sufficient respect and 
protection of animal dignity. This sets the benchmark for the protection of animal dignity within the 
simplified procedure. I will argue that the key to an effective protection of animal dignity within the 
                                                 
28 Arts. 148, 149 AniPO; Isabelle Häner, Gieri Bolliger and Antoine F Goetschel, Geheimhaltungspflicht von Mitgliedern 
der Tierversuchskommissionen: (namentlich im Kanton Zürich) (Schriften zum Tier im Recht volume 5, Schulthess 2011) 
discusses the role of the cantonal commission on animal experimentation within the Canton Zurich.  




“regular” authorisation procedure lies in the harm–benefit assessment. I will also demonstrate that the 
consideration of animal dignity is a distinct criterion and independent of the harm–benefit assessment.  
The harm–benefit evaluation 
As outlined above, animal dignity is not an absolute concept. On this basis, the Swiss legal system does 
not prohibit animal experimentation in principle. However, there is no “right to animal experimentation” 
either. Instead, if the use of an animal conflicts with animal dignity, the conflicting interests need to be 
weighed. There, the violation of animal dignity has to be justified in order to go through with the 
experimentation. The definition in Art. 3 lit. a AniPA determines various violations of animal dignity. 
Such a violation does not have to cause physical injury to the animal, but the act must include certain 
types of activities affecting the animal, even if the animal itself does not perceive them as harmful.30 If 
society’s interest is not apt to justify the particular violation, animal dignity is “impermissibly 
disregarded”.31  
In this context, permitting an animal experiment is subject to a case-by-case assessment, in which the use 
of an animal for experimental purposes causing pain, suffering, harm or distress for the animal needs to 
be weighed against the expected outcome of the project. The cantonal veterinary office in cooperation 
with the cantonal commission for animal experiments perform this harm–benefit assessment within the 
licensing procedure (Art. 19 para. 4 AniPA; Art. 140 para. 1 lit. b AniPO).32 In the evaluation, first, the 
conflicting interests are determined, evaluated and rated. Then, they are weighed against each other.33 If 
the infliction of pain, suffering, damage or anxiety weighs more than the expected interests, benefits and 
objectives, the authority declines the license.34 To arrive at a well-founded (moral) decision, the authority 
                                                 
30 Federal Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology/Swiss Committee on Animal Experiments (n 9), at 8; Bolliger, 
‘Legal Protection of Animal Dignity in Switzerland: Status Quo and Future Perspectives’ (n 19), 338. 
31 ibid, at 345; Samuel Camenzind, ‘Auf zu neuen Ufern: Rechtsphilosophische Überlegungen zur übermässigen 
Instrumentalisierung im schweizerischen Tierschutzgesetz’ in Margot Michel (ed), Animal Law: Developments and 
perspectives in the 21st century = Tier und Recht ; Entwicklungen und Perspektiven im 21. Jahrhundert (BWV Berliner 
Wiss.-Verl. 2012), at 186. 
32 Ethikkommission für Tierversuche der Akademien der Wissenschaften Schweiz, ‘Ethische Grundsätze und Richtlinien für 
Tierversuche’ (2005); Katharina Friedli, ‘The Dignity of the Nibble Fish - Weighing the Benefits’ (2014) Animal Welfare 
Report 2014 21; Franz P Gruber, ‘Güterabwägung aus der Sicht des Tierschutzes’ in Animalfree Research (ed), Gesundheit 
und Tierschutz - Güterabwägung bei Tierversuchen (2008); Andrew Knight, The costs and benefits of animal experiments 
(2011), passim. 
33 Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, ‘Dignity of the animal’ (n 7). 
34 Cf. Art. 19 para. 4 AniPA; Bolliger, ‘Legal Protection of Animal Dignity in Switzerland: Status Quo and Future 




gathers additional empirical information, e.g. the number and kind of animals being involved, the amount 
of animals being killed and the intervention in their well-being. During the assessment, the authority pays 
further attention to the principle of proportionality.35 This means that the infringement needs to be 
suitable and necessary for achieving the intended aim as well as proportional to the aim.36 As a rule, “the 
more serious an interference in the dignity of animals and the more trivial, or even unnecessary, it is in 
terms of human interest, the more critically it must be evaluated. Conversely, however, the more 
negligible an intervention is for the affected animals and the more necessary it is in the interest of other 
living creatures, the more it must be considered tolerable.”37 In other words, the more severe the strain 
is, the more restrictive are the licensing conditions.38  
The competent authority faces a major difficulty in carrying out the evaluation: the weighing of the 
contrary interests requires a moral judgement taking into account scientific considerations, which means 
that the assessment needs to be normative, not empirical. In other words, the decision concerns the way 
something should be, not the way it is.39 Thus, the authority’s balancing is not based on quantifiable 
criteria, but on expectations and presumptions of the impact of the animal experiment on the particular 
animal and the expected benefit on humans, society or the environment. This leads to a significant degree 
of discretion on the part of the authority conducting the assessment. The uncertainty is amplified by the 
fact that neither the AniPA nor the AniPO specify the requirements of the assessment in general or the 
inclusion of the concept of animal dignity in particular. Even though Arts. 139–140 AniPO contain some 
requirements to be included in the decision-making process, in practice, the assessment is in large parts 
assigned to the competent authority.40  
                                                 
35 See in detail Friedli (n 32), at 22; Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, ‘Dignity of the animal’ (n 7), at 7 et seq.  
36 This well-known and acknowledged legal principle of Swiss administration law is guaranteed in Arts. 5 para 2 and 36 
para. 3 Cst. See especially Fleiner-Gerster, Misic and Töpperwien (n 18) (providing further references), at 231 et seq.; 
Thomas Fleiner, ‘Cantonal and Federal Administrative Law in Switzerland’ in F. Dessemontet and T. Ansay (eds), 
Introduction to Swiss law (2nd ed. Kluwer Law International 1995);  
37 Federal Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology/Swiss Committee on Animal Experiments (n 9), at 8. 
38 ibid, at 2 et seq. 
39 Vanessa Gerritsen, ‘Evaluation Process for Animal Experiment Applications in Switzerland’ (2015) ALTEX Proceedings 





Animal dignity as criterion in the harm–benefit assessment  
The harm–benefit assessment allows the legislator and the authorities to apply animal dignity in 
practice.41 Yet, at the same time, the animal welfare legislation is silent on whether and how to include 
animal dignity into the assessment.42 However, the applicable provisions indicate that animal dignity is 
an additional assessment criterion within the harm–benefit ratio, which the competent authority always 
has to take into account when evaluating an application for a permission to perform animal 
experimentation. 
Art. 1 AniPA identifies the act’s purpose as the protection of the animal’s well-being and its dignity. The 
nature and general scheme of the AniPA obliges the authority to respect and protect animal dignity in all 
areas regulated by the AniPA, including the licensing process of animal experiments (Art. 18 para. 1 
AniPA). Hence, animal dignity has to be taken into account by the competent authority when conducting 
a harm–benefit assessment (Art. 19 para. 4 AniPA).  
As was said already, animal dignity protects the inherent value of the animal from any kind of physical 
as well as psychological harm.43 The harm–benefit ratio requires, however, for the harm to exceed a 
certain degree of severity (cf. Art. 24, 15 AniEO). A purely psychological constraint or an activity that 
the animal might not even perceive as harmful (e.g. humiliation or instrumentalization) is not sufficient 
in order to outbalance the benefits when evaluating the (potential) harm of an animal experiment.44 Thus, 
the dignity is not included sufficiently in the harm–benefit assessment. In consequence, and to give 
practical effect to the dignity of the individual animal within the harm–benefit assessment, it must be 
considered as an additional (independent) criterion within the assessment, which stands equally alongside 
the strains inflicted on the animal and the expected outcome. This approach ensures that animal dignity 
is integrated within the harm–benefit assessment, especially when the infringement consists of a non-
                                                 
41 Federal Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology/Swiss Committee on Animal Experiments (n 9). 
42 This discussion is still not completely resolved. The Swiss Academies of Art and Sciences advocate that the dignity itself 
is not part of the harm–benefit assessment, but the reason for the evaluation. A more differentiated view takes Kunzmann (n 
21), at 56 et seq.  
43 ibid, at 56 et seq. 
44 Kunzmann (n 21); Klaus P Rippe, ‘Güterabwägung im Tierversuchsbereich: Anmerkung zu einem ethischen 




physiological harm. In this regard, the harm–benefit assessment is the key factor regarding the sufficient 
respect and protection of animal dignity within the authorisation procedure.  
5. Protection of animal dignity within the simplified procedure 
The simplified procedure is free from a “traditional” harm–benefit ratio, but obligates the regulator to 
perform an “abstract harm–benefit assessment” of the established methods. In the simplified procedure, 
the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office weighs the strain inflicted on the animal against the benefit 
in advance of the actual application. The regulator, therefore, assumes that these procedures and their 
implications on the animal have been sufficiently reviewed and examined, which, as a result, means that 
there is no need for further assessment – in contrast to the full-fledged harm–benefit evaluation 
mentioned above.45 Hence, the methods in Annex 1 AniEO are not subject to another evaluation during 
the authorisation procedure.46 The abstract harm–benefit assessment supplants a case-by-case evaluation 
in context of the regular procedure. Additionally, the applicant is obliged to ensure that the breeding of 
a transgenic animal does not follow an illegitimate purpose or disregards animal dignity (Art. 142 para. 
2 lit. b AniPO). 
The authority is, however, obliged to conduct a so-called “trailed assessment” (“nachgezogene 
Güterabwägung”)47 in case the producer reports strains on the animal during the breeding. Art. 12 AniPA 
stipulates reporting obligations, namely that the head of the breeding facility frequently controls whether 
the modification or the breeding procedure cause pain, suffering, harm or anxiety or any other violation 
of animal dignity (“record of constraint”48; Belastungserfassung; Art. 124 AniPO).49 The different strains 
                                                 
45 This is implied by Hermann Geissbühler, ‘Die Kriterien der Würde der Kreatur und der Menschenwürde in der 
Gesetzgebung zur Gentechnologie – Eine Übersicht über Grundsatzprobleme: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Gen-
Lex-Vorlage’ (2001) 137 ZBJV 229, at 247 et seq. 
46 Errass, Öffentliches Recht der Gentechnologie im Ausserhumanbereich (n 10), at 146 et seq., Errass, ‘20 Jahre Würde der 
Kreatur’ (n 9), at 220.  
47 Federal Council (n 21), at 53. 
48 The Swiss legislator has translated the term “Belastung” as “constraint” rather than “burden”. This emphasises the 
different kinds of infringements of the animal’s well–being. Laboratory animals can suffer both physical and psychological 
harms (e.g. humiliation, instrumentalization), whereas the animal may not even discern the harm. In other words, it is of no 
relevance whether the animal realises the infringement of its dignity or well-being, but that an objective third party (e.g. the 
administration) considers it as a “Belastung” inflicted on the animal. Therefore, the term constraint (“Belastung”) requires 
an active participation in the infliction of harm on the animal by the human user. The legislator has chosen this broad 
translation in order to guarantee an extensive interpretation of the constraint. Cf. Federal Council (n 24), at 53 s. 
49 The record of constraint encompasses genetically modified animal lines as well as strained mutants. In the interest of 
simplification, the following sections refer to genetically modified or transgenic animals. The provisions addressed apply to 




which need to be considered during this monitoring arise from Art. 3 lit a AniPA.50 If the outcome of the 
record of constraint demonstrates a violation of animal dignity, the head of the facility is obliged to report 
the results to the competent cantonal authority, where he or she presents all information defined in Art. 
126 para. 2 AniPO in order to initiate a trailed harm–benefit assessment. The provisions of the AniPO 
and AniEO define the details of the procedure.51 Based on this information the competent authority 
reviews the indispensability of the breeding and modification according to Art. 137 AniPO and conducts 
an ex ante harm–benefit evaluation.52 The competent authority thereupon transfers the matter to the 
cantonal commission for animal experimentation, which weighs the constraint against the benefit for 
research, therapy and diagnostics. Thereby, the commission gives special credit to the future purpose of 
the transgenic animal. Should the breeding be associated with strains amounting to the highest degree of 
severity, it needs to be closely evaluated whether the transgenic animal is suitable to be subject to 
(stressful) experiments afterwards.53 However, the animal’s suffering during the different procedures 
cannot be accumulated.54 The basic principle applies: the more severe the strain, the more restrictive the 
licensing conditions. At the end of the procedure the authority issues a decision, in which it defines the 
conditions for further breeding (Art. 127 AniPO). Although the animal welfare legislation does not 
explicitly provide for the duty to suspend further breeding during the ex ante assessment, it can be 
presumed that the breeding is on hold during the decision-making, as the competent authority has not yet 
issued a permission to breed transgenic animals that inflict (unexpected) strains on the animal. General 
principles of Swiss administrative law entail that the facility is not entitled to breed these animals until 
receiving a modified permission.55 Regardless, it seems de facto unlikely that a facility would continue 
breeding transgenic animals if it is unclear whether it receives an approval, considering the very high 
costs of breeding transgenic animals.56  
                                                 
50 As a reminder, Art. 3 AniPA defines strain as pain, suffering or harm, anxiety or humiliation as well as major interference 
with the animal’s appearance or abilities and excessive instrumentalization. 
51 Cf. Art. 12 para. 3 AniPA. 
52 Art. 127 AniPO. 
53 Federal Council (n 21), at 53. 
54 Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, ‘Dignity of the animal’ (n 7), at 8. The Federal Food Safety and Veterinary 
Office clarifies that different strains cannot “add up to a total”.  
55 Ulrich Häfelin, Georg Müller and Felix Uhlmann, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (5th ed. Schulthess; Dike 2006), at 348 
et seq. 




The following sections examine to what extent the simplified authorisation procedure effectively takes 
the protection of animal dignity into account, when transgenic animals bred for test purposes are 
concerned. I will first focus on the impact of non-physical violations of animal dignity and then discuss 
the risk of misuse of the reporting obligations within the simplified procedure. 
Non-physical infringements of animal dignity  
According to the preparatory works to the AniPO, every genetic modification – regardless of the method 
being used or its severity – infringes animal dignity.57 Yet, under certain circumstances animal dignity 
can be restricted to protect prevalent public interests, as long as the activity does not encroach on its 
sacrosanct core.58  
The trailed assessment is initiated if the record of constraint displays “reasonable suspicion” that the 
strains on the animal exceed a certain degree of severity.59 The severity inherently relates to physical 
harm and suffering. If a genetic modification entails no or only slight strains, there is no reporting 
obligation and subsequently no obligation to conduct a trailed assessment.60 It appears, thus, that a genetic 
modification caused by the use of an established method needs to exceed a certain degree of severity in 
order to disregard animal dignity and, therefore, to initiate the assessment. 
As a side note, the dignity of the used carriers – in other words the parent animals – is also subject to 
monitoring. The infringement of these animals’ dignity is “tolerated” until the first record of constraint 
is conducted. In contrast to the regular procedure, in which all potential infringements are considered 
before the license is issued by the competent authority, the simplified procedure in conjunction with the 
                                                 
57 Federal Council (n 21), at 53. 
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und rechtliche Beiträge zu einem umstrittenen Konzept (Schulthess 2015), 265; Bolliger, ‘Legal Protection of Animal 
Dignity in Switzerland: Status Quo and Future Perspectives’ (n 19), at 345 (providing further references). 
59 Cf. Arts. 124, 127 AniPO, Art. 25 AniEO; Regina Binder, ‘Würde erster und zweiter Klasse? : Überlegungen zur 
Forderung nach Anerkennung der Würde aus tierschutzrechtlicher Sicht’ (2011) 3 TIERethik 32, at 32 et seq. 
60 Federal Council (n 21), at 53; Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, ‘Explanatory notes on the data sheet’ (2016) 
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reporting obligation establishes a system in which constraints are assumed to be justified, as the animals 
are treated in an “animal friendly” way by using an established method that was safeguarded by the 
abstract evaluation. 
The simplified procedure focuses exclusively on established methods to ascertain that only “animal 
friendly” methods are excluded from the regular procedure.61 Since the legislator has already carried out 
the abstract harm–benefit evaluation beforehand, it can be assumed that sufficient checks have been made 
as to whether the intended method and following use encroaches on the core content of animal dignity 
or not. By including the method in question into Annex 1 AniEO, the regulator assumes that the method 
does not affect the core content, which makes “another” weighing necessary solely in case “reasonable 
suspicions” arise that animal dignity, including its core, is unjustifiably infringed.62 As the abstract harm–
benefit assessment is closely associated with the evaluation conducted during the “regular” procedure, I 
presume that animal dignity constitutes an indispensable aspect within the abstract assessment, too. Thus, 
the regulator and the competent authority ensure that non-physical violations of animal dignity are 
adequately taken into account. There seems to be no need for another assessment when the infringement 
does not exceed a certain degree of severity. On this basis, I conclude that sufficient protection of animal 
dignity is ensured within the simplified procedure.  
Risk of misuse of the procedure 
As was said, the record of constraint results in reporting obligations: the Federal Food Safety and 
Veterinary Office commits the manager of the breeding facility to analyse constraints inflicted upon the 
animal and to report burdened lines and mutants within two weeks after the determination of the strains 
to the competent authority, but at the latest when reported on five animals.63 The final notification of 
strains must be made at the latest when 100 animals have been inspected (Arts. 14, 18 AniEO). In case 
no constraints appear, Art. 145 para. 1 lit. b AniPO stipulates an annual submission of information 
regarding the transgenic animals being bred and subsequently used for animal experimentation. The 
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responsible person provides data about the number of animals, genetic modifications and subsequent use 
of the transgenic animals.  
A certain risk arises that the manager of the breeding facility does not submit the record of constraint to 
avoid the trailed assessment and therefore bureaucratic efforts and production costs. However, the AniPO 
introduces some safety nets in this regard. First, when applying for a permit for an animal experiment 
the applicant needs to provide the data on the record of constraint, regardless of the fact whether 
constraints have actually been monitored. If not provided, the licence will not be issued.64 Second, Art. 
124 para. 3 AniPO obliges the head of the breeding facility to perform an annual animal inventory 
control, including the documentation of the number of animals being born and their potential strains, and 
provide the data upon request to the competent authority (Art. 143 para. 3 AniPO). Finally, the competent 
cantonal authority inspects the breeding facilities at least once a year. It is, however, free to carry out 
more inspections if considered necessary (Art. 216 para. 1 AniPO). As a rule, these inspections occur 
unannounced and entail the control of the compliance with the conditions possibly attached to the 
authorisation, the condition of the animals and the infrastructure, the personnel requirements, the 
inspection of livestock numbers and the data on the burden on genetically modified animals or lines (Art. 
216 para. 2 AniPO). Furthermore, the cantonal authority annually inspects the performance of animal 
experiments of at least one fifth of the current permits (Art. 216 para. 3, 4 AniPO). The selection is made 
according to the extent of the burden on the animals, the number of animals and the technical complexity 
of the tests. 
In conclusion, the risk of misuse is not to be underestimated, but there are a number of measures to 
mitigate it. 
6. The instrumentalization of test-tube animals  
Test-tube animals that are bred for a subsequent scientific use solely serve as laboratory test subjects and 
are “disposed” of if they do not exhibit the demanded features. This leads to the impression that the 
breeding of these animals qualifies as excessive or even exclusive instrumentalization. While Art. 3 lit. 
a AniPA prohibits any kind of excessive unjustified instrumentalization of animals, this article claims 
                                                 




that exclusive instrumentalization is an encroachment on the sacrosanct core of animal dignity and thus 
never justifiable (cf. Art. 120 Cst.).65 In case animals are genetically modified and bred solely for 
experimental purposes, one has to ask: is this activity to be classified as exclusive or excessive 
instrumentalization? Is this instrumentalization justified? I argue that the breeding and the modification 
of the animal’s phenotype falls under the scope of excessive instrumentalization, which, however, cannot 
be justified by prevailing interests.  
An impermissible infringement of animal dignity?  
Excessive instrumentalization is constituted by every type of conduct aiming to use an animal solely as 
a “tool” without giving consideration to its interests or its physical and mental needs.66 Such an animal’s 
only purpose is to serve human interests; it is therefore objectified.67 The exact threshold has not yet been 
exhaustively determined, since humans instrumentalize animals in various ways of varying severity 
(food, research, clothes etc).68 However, an instance of exclusive instrumentalization is at hand when the 
animal is no longer seen as an independent living being with an inherent and intrinsic value, but only as 
a tool for human purposes.69 Distinguishing between exclusive and excessive instrumentalization proves 
to be rather difficult. Art. 142 para. 1 lit. b AniPO emphasises that under the simplified procedure a 
license shall only be issued if animal dignity is respected. This means that the applicant at least has to 
consider the animal’s inherent value and its dignity when breeding a genetically modified animal for test 
purposes using established methods. During its inspections, the competent authority monitors whether 
animal dignity is respected and protected. As the intrinsic value is an indispensable criterion of both the 
simplified as well as the regular procedure, the breeding of test-tube animals for experimental purposes 
is more aptly described as an instance of excessive than as of exclusive instrumentalization. 
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67 Camenzind (n 31), at 190; Michel, ‘Instrumentalisierung und Würde der Kreatur - eine Annäherung an ein grundlegendes 
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Justification of the instrumentalization 
The Gene Technology Act (GTA), whose purpose is the protection of human beings, animals and the 
environment from abuses of gene technology, provides some insight regarding how acts that infringe 
upon transgenic animal dignity can be justified.70 According to the preparatory works of the AniPA and 
the AniPO, provisions of the GTA, especially Arts. 8 and 9, complement the animal welfare legislation 
when animals are subjected to genetic modifications; this is due to the topical overlap of these 
provisions.71 Both the animal welfare legislation and the GTA apply in case of the application of breeding 
transgenic animals using established methods and, subsequently, when undergoing the simplified 
procedure. Whereas the AniPA and the AniPO lack precise directions on how to weigh the harms and 
benefits, Arts. 8 and 9 GTA provide a detailed framework of the substantive legal requirements regarding 
the aspects which are to be taken into account.72 Taken together, animal welfare legislation and the GTA 
provide almost complete directions on how to evaluate the excessive instrumentalization in the matter at 
hand.  
Human and animal health as well as increasing knowledge as prevailing interests 
Art. 8 para. 2 GTA provides a non-exhaustive list of overriding interests that may justify an act violating 
animal dignity: (a) human and animal health, (b) food security, (c) reduction of harm caused to the 
environment, (d) preservation and improvement of environmental conditions, (e) securing a substantial 
economic, social or environmental benefit for society, and (f) increasing knowledge. The violation of 
animal dignity must be directly justified by a prevailing interest.73 An indirect or even collateral relevance 
is not sufficient; the excessive instrumentalization of the animal has to contribute directly to furthering 
the interest.74 When breeding transgenic animals, the phenotype is genetically modified in order to breed 
suitable “models” for certain experiments. The breeder, as a rule, expects a certain outcome that can only 
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be ensured by modifying the animal’s phenotype.75 In this context two interests appear to be able to 
justify the excessive instrumentalization: the protection of human and animal health and the accumulation 
of knowledge.  
Transgenic animals are bred in order to perform experiments that aim, among other things, at making 
progress in the protection of human and animal health (e.g. medical progress). However, the breeding of 
transgenic animals itself does not contribute directly to this goal, but is rather “a step along the way”. 
Human and animal health as laid down in Art. 8 para. 2 lit. a GTA, therefore, cannot justify the excessive 
instrumentalization, which transgenic animals suffer when being bred exclusively for experimental 
purposes. The basis of this reasoning also applies to the interest in the accumulation of knowledge. The 
modification of the phenotype of an animal could be subsumed as a pure interest in increasing knowledge 
in accordance with Art. 8 para. 2 lit. f GTA.76 However, transgenic animals that are bred to be used in 
animal experiments – which are the focus of this article – do not contribute directly to the increase of 
general knowledge. Their purpose rather lies within the “production” of models for certain experiments. 
As a consequence, the interests laid down in Art. 8 GTA do not prevail over the harm the animal suffers 
due to the violation of its dignity. 
Existential necessity of genetic modifications 
What was said above raises the question whether unavoidability or existential necessity alone constitute 
justifiable grounds for human interventions that seriously infringe upon animal dignity.77 In other words, 
the necessity to exclude risks concerning the accuracy of test results by “modelling” the perfect 
laboratory animal seems to justify the excessive instrumentalization. This idea is hardly convincing. In 
general, the reasons for justification are to be interpreted in a rather restrictive way in order to avoid a 
dilution of the concept of animal dignity. Even if the justifications are not conclusively regulated, either 
in the animal welfare legislation or in the GTA, this does not result in an indiscriminate justification of 
an encroachment on animal dignity. It rather means that a justification must be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis in accordance with the proportionality test. When applying the threefold proportionality test 
in this context, I hold that it turns out to be to the benefit of the animal. Whether the breeding of transgenic 
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animals is, indeed, suitable as well as necessary to improve animal models and the subsequent research 
results can be a matter of debate. The breeder, as a rule, expects to use the modified animal for a particular 
experiment in order to improve the accuracy of the test results. Considering the fact that research in 
alternative methods has been developing rapidly, rendering the use of animals obsolete in some areas, 
the necessity could be challenged.78 However, certain research fields exist where alternative methods 
cannot or are legally not allowed to replace animal experimentation – yet.79 The measure is, therefore, at 
least in some areas suitable and necessary to reach the aim.  
However, the instrumentalization is not proportionate. In order to justify the present excessive 
instrumentalization, the human user’s interests (acquiring better “models”) must prevail in the 
proportionality test. If the transgenic animal does not exhibit the required feature, it is “disposed of”.80 
In other words, a great number of animals are killed to “produce” a few suitable models.81 The disposed 
animals are neither considered within the record of constraint within the simplified procedure, nor do 
they initiate any other reporting obligations.82 Even though the number of these animals is registered, 
and the head of the breeding facility is obliged to annually report the number of animals being born (and 
killed) within the facility,83 it has to be emphasized that this is purely about passing on information. There 
is no evaluation of the breeding results. The regulator justifies this especially by the fact that animals 
suffering a possible severe constraint are killed painlessly. They, therefore, supposedly do not suffer any 
harm; yet, they suffer the greatest harm – death.84 In addition, these animals are often simply killed 
because they do not exhibit the desired features. Also, the argument that fewer animals are used when 
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utilizing transgenic models appears to be untenable, since a high number of animals is killed in order to 
obtain only a few animals exhibiting the “correct” phenotype.85 Finally, it is unclear whether the results 
of the subsequent conducted research can be transferred on human beings.86 I conclude, therefore, that 
the excessive instrumentalization of transgenic animals based on unavoidability or existential necessity 
alone is disproportionate.  
As a consequence, the breeding of a genetically modified animal for test purposes using established 
methods constitutes an unjustified excessive instrumentalization. This tension could be resolved by not 
undergoing the simplified procedure, but the regular procedure, in which the instrumentalization and 
especially the expected amount of disposed animals can be assessed beforehand. As a result, the 
competent authority would have to refuse to issue a license for the breeding of transgenic animals which 
result in a high number of disposed animals. 
7. Conclusion 
Swiss law knows of a globally unique principle: it enshrines the dignity of the living beings, 
including animal dignity, within its constitutional as well as statutory law. Animal d ignity is 
interpreted similarly as, yet not identically with, human dignity. This supports the conclusion that 
animal dignity has a similar inviolable core content as human dignity.  
The core content of animal dignity is of particular interest when examining the authorisation 
processes of animal experiments. In addition to the regular procedure, the legislator has introduced 
a simplified procedure, which is used when breeding genetically modified animals using established 
methods. This article analyzed the following central questions: Does the simplified procedure 
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sufficiently protect animal dignity? Does the breeding of genetically modified animals for 
experimental purposes disproportionately instrumentalize these animals?  
I demonstrated, first, that animal dignity is to be considered as an independent criterion within the 
harm–benefit assessment to give practical effect to animal dignity. I then analysed whether the 
simplified procedure – by solely introducing a trailed assessment – provides an equal or at least 
sufficient level of protection as the regular procedure. I came to the conclusion that even if the 
simplified procedure comes with certain risks, it still provides a sufficient degree of protection. The 
risk that the strains inflicted on the animals are not reported has to be taken seriously, but the animal 
welfare legislation provides several reporting and information provisions to ensure the conduction 
of a harm–benefit assessment. Also, the fact that the weighing is only carried out after the strains 
have occurred raises doubts whether the simplified procedure provides a sufficient protection of 
animal dignity. However, the simplified procedure only applies if the researcher uses established 
methods that are “animal friendly”. The regulator ensures  the harmlessness of these methods by 
conducting an abstract harm–benefit assessment. In addition, the record of constraint guarantees the 
initiation of the trailed assessment in case strains appear on the animal.  
The excessive instrumentalization of transgenic animals being bred for a subsequent laboratory use 
causes serious doubts about adequate animal dignity protection within the simplified procedure. The 
instrumentalization does not yet exceed the threshold of an infringement of the sacrosanct core of animal 
dignity. This entails that prevailing interests can, in principle, justify the resulting infringement of animal 
dignity. Yet, convincing justifications do not appear to arise from the interests listed within the GTA. 
Moreover, a justification based on pure necessity and unavoidability fails at the last hurdle – the threefold 
proportionality test. Even though genetically modifying an animal to use it for test purposes afterwards 
is suitable and (to a certain extent) necessary, it is not proportionate. The high number of animals being 
disposed of during the processes due to their lack of the sought-after features is disproportionate in 
relation to the excessive instrumentalization of these animals. This is especially the case, as they are not 
the subject of any (ex ante) harm–benefit assessment. The application of the simplified procedure is, as 
a consequence, not sufficient to protect their dignity. However, this conflict could be resolved by 
excluding animals being bred for scientific purposes from the simplified procedure and ascribing the 
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